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Should the best or worst goods be sold ﬁrst? This question arises whenever a seller has some private
information about the quality of her goods and is concerned about the impact that early sales will
have on buyer expectations. For instance, in privatization auctions should a government sell its most
promising ﬁrms ﬁrst to create a favorable impression on in v e s t o r s ,o rs h o u l di tw a r mu pi n v e s t o r s
with less valuable ﬁrms? Similarly, should a ﬁrm that is selling oﬀ multiple units start with the most
proﬁtable or least proﬁtable ones? Closely related questions arise in a wide variety of situations, such
as whether to present the better of two papers ﬁrst, or to put the stronger of two job candidates on the
market ﬁrst. The traditional counsel to “put one’s best foot forward” might seem appropriate, but so
does the admonition to “save the best for last”.
To investigate this conﬂicting advice we consider an auction where a seller has private information
about the values of two stochastically identical and independently distributed goods. We look at
the strategic sequencing problem from two related perspectives. First, from a revenue-maximizing
perspective, if the seller could commit to a sequencing strategy instead of randomly ordering the goods
how are revenues aﬀected? Second, from an equilibrium perspective, can a sequencing strategy be
credible even without commitment? That is, if buyers believe that the seller is leading with the better
or worse good will the seller actually beneﬁt from doing so, or will the seller prefer to fool buyers by
reversing the order?
We ﬁrst investigate the simpler case where the goods are auctioned simultaneously so that no
information is released between auctions. In a simultaneous auction the equivalent of a sequencing
strategy is for the seller to rank the two goods. Such information raises the expected price for one good
and lowers it for the other good, but on average generates higher expected revenues than selling the
goods in random order.1 This follows from the “linkage principle” that a policy of publicly revealing
information equalizes the knowledge of buyers and thereby leads to more competitive bidding (Milgrom
and Weber, 1982). A typical problem with implementing the linkage principle is that the seller has an
incentive to exaggerate so committing to a policy of truthful revelation can be diﬃcult. Looking at the
problem from an equilibrium perspective, we show that ranking the goods can be credible because the
ranking provides both favorable and unfavorable information at the same time. The ranking does not
fully reveal the seller’s information, but it does reveal some information and therefore increases seller
revenues.
Using the simultaneous auction as a baseline, we then consider the sequential auction where one
of the two goods is sold ﬁrst. The diﬀerence is that buyers of the second period good now observe
the ﬁrst period price or other information about the ﬁrst period good. For instance, in a privatization
auction buyers of a ﬁrm sold later see the price of a ﬁrm sold ﬁrst and, if the interval between auctions
1The ranking of goods in a simultaneous auction is examined in a pure common value context in Chakraborty, Gupta,
and Harbaugh (2002). Here we consider the more general aﬃliated values case.
1is suﬃcient, may also observe the post-privatization performance of the ﬁrst ﬁrm. Because the values of
the two goods are independently distributed, information from the ﬁrst period may seem irrelevant for
the second period good. However, we show that the seller’s sequencing strategy endogenously generates
correlation across the two auction periods by truncating the distribution of the second period good.
Because of this endogenous correlation, the ﬁrst period information is itself a public signal that, on
average, increases the second period price in accordance with the linkage principle.2 Therefore, if the
seller can commit to a sequencing strategy, revenues are increased both by the rank information and
by the ﬁrst period information.
Looking at the sequential auction from an equilibrium perspective, we ﬁnd that the endogenous cor-
relation gives the seller an incentive to strategically sequence the goods so as to make the most favorable
impression on second period buyers. If buyers expect a best foot forward strategy, unexpectedly selling
the worse good ﬁrst will lead second period buyers to infer the second good is also low quality. So
the “impression eﬀect” from observing the ﬁrst period signal penalizes deviation from the best foot
forward strategy. But if buyers expect a best for last strategy, unexpectedly selling the better good ﬁrst
will lead second period buyers to think the second good is also high quality. So the impression eﬀect
encourages deviation from the best for last strategy. We ﬁnd that the best foot forward strategy is an
equilibrium in the sequential auction whenever the best for last strategy is, that it is an equilibrium
whenever ranking the goods is an equilibrium in the simultaneous auction, and that it is the unique
pure strategy equilibrium when the impression eﬀect is suﬃciently strong.
While either sequencing strategy increases expected revenues by revealing the seller’s ordinal infor-
mation and the ﬁrst period price or other information, there may be tension between the sequencing
strategy that is an equilibrium and the sequencing strategy that maximizes revenues. In particular,
since best for last is never the unique pure strategy equilibrium, a conﬂict can arise between best for
last as the revenue-maximizing strategy and best foot forward as the equilibrium strategy. In an exam-
ple we ﬁnd that expected revenues are slightly higher from the best for last strategy for all parameter
values even though best foot forward is the unique pure strategy equilibrium for a subset of parameter
values. If the seller could commit to a strategy she would therefore prefer best for last. But without
commitment, best foot forward is the only credible sequencing strategy.
The issue of how to sequence the sale of goods can arise in any situation where a seller of multiple
products has some private information about the quality of the goods. For example, in privatization
auctions governments usually sequence the sale of companies over many years rather than following
a “big bang” strategy of privatizing ﬁrms simultaneously (Roland, 2000). A common explanation for
this delay is fear of selling ﬁrms at below market value. From the perspective of auction theory, this
concern is justiﬁable whenever the lack of reliable public information about formerly state-owned ﬁrms
2This eﬀect has been previously noted in cases where the values of the two goods are identical (Milgrom and Weber)
or exogenously correlated (Hausch, 1986), but we show that endogenous correlation induces the same eﬀect even when
the two goods are ex ante independent.
2gives privately informed buyers substantial information rents. This paper indicates that sequential
privatization can increase revenues by credibly and publicly revealing information to all buyers, thereby
reducing the value of private information and reducing buyer information rents. The same logic also
applies to divestiture auctions.3 The restructuring literature has shown that the decision to sell assets
implies information about both the value of the assets and the value of the remaining ﬁrm (Nanda,
1991). Our results imply that, when multiple assets are sold, the sequencing decision also reveals
information about the relative values of the assets. This information will decrease the expected price
of one asset and increase the expected price of the other, but on average will increase revenues.
Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar (2003) show that in the mass privatization programs undertaken in the
Czech Republic more proﬁtable ﬁrms were auctioned ﬁrst, a phenomenon that appears to be widespread
in transitional economies (Claessens and Djankov, 2002) and that is consistent with our result that the
impression eﬀect favors a best foot forward strategy. The possible role of sequencing strategies is
important for measuring the impact of privatization. For instance, the fact that ﬁrms sold earlier
tend to out-perform ﬁrms sold later has been taken to reﬂect eﬃciency gains from early privatization
(Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999), but it could also reﬂe c tu s eo fab e s tf o o tf o r w a r ds t r a t e g y .
T h eb e s tf o o tf o r w a r ds t r a t e g ym a ya l s oo ﬀer insight into the “declining price anomaly” or “af-
ternoon eﬀect” in which the prices for comparably valued goods fall during the course of a sequential
auction (Ashenfelter, 1989; McAfee and Vincent, 1993). If the goods are identical or correlated in value
(e.g., bottles of the same vintage of wine), the pattern contradicts the linkage principle since public
information about bids in auctions of earlier goods should lead to higher expected prices for later goods
(Milgrom and Weber, 1982, 2000). And if the values of the goods are independently distributed (e.g.,
companies in diﬀerent industries) there should be no regular price pattern. For non-identical goods we
ﬁnd that declining prices may result because the quality of the second good is on average lower than the
ﬁrst good based on the seller’s private information. Under our assumption of independently distributed
values, prices always fall under the best foot forward strategy. In an extension of the model we examine
correlated values and in this case prices could rise or fall.
That the sequencing of goods based on hard to observe quality diﬀerences might be one factor behind
declining prices has been previously recognized in the empirical literature. For instance, Ashenfelter
and Genesove (1992) consider that condominiums of the same type in a single development may diﬀer
subtly in location and that the best ones are likely to be bought ﬁrst. In their analysis of the market
for Picasso prints, Pesando and Shum (1996) note that diﬀerent impressions vary slightly in condition
and that it is common practice among auction houses to oﬀer the better impression ﬁrst. Ginsburgh
(1998) notes that wines of the same vintage vary slightly in quality due to such factors as fullness of
the bottle and consequent air exposure, and that the policy at Christie’s auction house is to sell the
3In a sample of divestitures in the 1989-1998 period, Boone and Mulherin (2002) ﬁnd that, contrary to much of the
discussion in the restructuring literature, auctions are a common selling mechanism.
3better wine ﬁrst.4 Whether the sequencing of goods is an important factor behind the declining price
anomaly is unresolved in the literature. Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992), Beggs and Graddy (1997),
and Ginsburgh (1998) ﬁnd that prices still fall after sequencing is controlled for, but Raviv (2003)
examines an auction where the seller randomly sells the goods and ﬁnds evidence that the declining
price anomaly disappears.
Previous theoretical analyses of sequencing consider private value auctions where the distributions
of valuations are known to be diﬀerent based on public information (Bernhardt and Scoones, 1994;
Beggs and Graddy, 1997; Baba, 1998; Benoit and Krishna, 2000; and Elmaghraby, 2003). Our model
applies to auctions with a common value component where, based on public information, the goods have
the same distribution of values, but where the auction participants have their own private information
about the values. Since the seller makes a sequencing decision based on her own private information,
the sequencing strategy can play a role in credibly (although, imperfectly) revealing this information
to buyers.5
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple example that illustrates the impression
eﬀect. Section 3 introduces the general auction model. Section 4 considers the impact on revenues if the
seller can commit to a sequencing strategy. Section 5 considers whether sequencing is an equilibrium
and analyzes the declining price anomaly. Section 6 extends the model to examine exogenous correlation
between the seller’s signals and shows that best foot forward is the unique pure strategy symmetric
equilibrium if correlation is suﬃciently strong. Section 7 presents an expanded example that illustrates
the key ﬁndings. Section 8 concludes the paper and the Appendix contains most of the proofs.
2 An Introductory Example
T h er o l eo ft h ei m p r e s s i o ne ﬀect in strategic sequencing can be seen in a simple common value auction
in which buyers do not have any private information so there are no information rents. Two ex ante
identical goods, a and b, are sold in two periods by a seller who observes the actual values, Va and Vb,
of the goods. The goods are independently distributed with support in {0,1}, and Pr[Vi =0 ]=P r [ Vi =
1] = 1
2 for i = a,b. There are two diﬀerent groups of two or more identical buyers in each period.
Buyers in the ﬁrst period bid the expected value of the good conditional on the seller’s strategy and
buyers in the second period bid the expected value of the good conditional on both the seller’s strategy
and the observed value of the ﬁrst good. Let V1 represent the value of the good sold ﬁrst and V2 the
4Pesando and Shun (1996) and Ginsburgh (1998) ﬁnd that some of the diﬀerences in quality are publicly stated by
the seller. Our model implies that the ordinal component of information released by the seller (including price estimates)
is often credible.
5In many auctions the goods are likely to diﬀe rb a s e do nb o t hp u b l i ci n f o r m a t i o na n dthe seller’s private information.
While additional issues are raised by such a mix, the role of the sequencing strategy in credibly revealing ordinal infor-
mation and the potential for conﬂict between equilibrium and revenue-maximizing strategies, remain as long as the seller
has any private information.
4Figure 1: Endogenous correlation from sequencing strategies
v a l u eo ft h eg o o ds o l ds e c o n d .
Figure 1 shows the distribution of values conditional on the seller’s sequencing strategy.6 Consider if
buyers believe that the seller follows the best foot forward strategy of selling the better good ﬁrst when
Va 6= Vb.I fe i t h e rVa =1o rVb = 1 buyers expect the ﬁr s tp e r i o dg o o dt ob eh i g hv a l u es o ,r e g a r d l e s s
of what the seller actually does, the ﬁrst period price is the probability Pr[V1 =1 ]=3
4.A n yi m p a c to f
the seller’s actions falls on the second period price. If the seller follows the best foot forward strategy
then second period buyers observe that a high value good was sold in the ﬁrst period, so the second
period price is Pr[V2 =1 |V1 =1 ]=1
3. If instead the seller deviates and leads with the worse good
then, expecting a best foot forward strategy, second period buyers will infer that if the ﬁrst good was
low value the second good must also be low value, so the second period price is Pr[V2 =1 |V1 =0 ]=0 .
Since deviation is not proﬁtable best foot forward is an equilibrium.7
It may seem that the problem is symmetric and best for last is also an equilibrium. Checking, buyers
believe the ﬁrst period good is high value only if both goods are high value so the ﬁrst period price is
Pr[V1 =1 ]=1
4. If the seller follows the best for last strategy then second period buyers observe that
a low value good was sold in the ﬁrst period, so the second period price is Pr[V2 =1 |V1 =0 ]=2
3.
However if the seller deviates and leads with the better good then the second period buyers believe
the second good must also be of high value so the price is Pr[V2 =1 |V1 = 1] = 1. Since deviation is
proﬁtable, best for last is not an equilibrium.
The seller wants to make a favorable impression even though goods a and b are independent because
the seller’s sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation across the two periods by truncating
the distribution of the second period good. This impression eﬀect oﬀers insight to a wide range of
situations where strategic sequencing arises. For instance, if the audience for a talk is proportional to
the expected quality of the talk, then a speaker wishing to maximize attendance at two talks should
6The correlation coeﬃcient between V1 and V2 is ρ = 1
3 in both cases. With binary values non-negative correlation is
equivalent to aﬃliation, which is the basis for the theoretical results in the next section.
7We have ignored the cases where both goods are high or low value and the seller just randomizes. Adding these cases
the expected payoﬀ from sticking to best foot forward is 3/4+( 1 /4)(1/3) + (1/2)(1/3) + (1/4)0 = 1 and the expected
payoﬀ from deviating is 3/4+( 1 /4)(1/3) + (1/2)0 + (1/4)0 = 5/6.
5start with the better talk. Of course, reality is often more complicated — audience members may have
diﬀerent opinions about the talk, their valuations of the talk might depend on the opinions of other
audience members, information about the ﬁrst talk may be imperfectly transmitted to the potential
audience for the second talk, etc. Formal auction models oﬀer a well-developed set of tools to capture
such complexities. In the following sections, we show th a tt h ei n c e n t i v et oc r e a t eaf a v o r a b l ei m p r e s s i o n
carries over to an aﬃliated values auction in which the seller need not be perfectly informed, the buyers
have private information that may be stronger than that of the seller, the good has diﬀering values to
diﬀerent buyers, and second period buyers observe only a noisy signal of the value of the ﬁrst period
good, such as its price.
3 The Model
Our auction model is based on Milgrom and Weber (1982), which includes both common value and
private value features. As in their model, the seller and the buyers all have some private information.
Distinct from their model, the seller can choose which of two goods to sell ﬁrst based on her private
information, and buyers in the second period observe some information about the value of the ﬁrst
period good. We describe the model below.
Goods, Signals & Values There is one seller who sells two goods indexed by k ∈ {a,b}.F o re a c h
good k the seller observes a private signal Sk ∈ {H,L} ⊂ R, where H>L .Thus the seller can tell if
good k is likely to be above average (Sk = H) or below average (Sk = L).8 This information is soft
in the sense that the seller cannot credibly reveal it, even though she may like to, except through the
sequencing strategy. Let Pr[Sk = H]=λ ∈ (0,1).
For each good k there is a group of n ≥ 2 buyers.9 Each buyer i observes a private signal of the
quality of the goods, Xik ∈ X ⊂ R.L e tXk =( X1k,...,Xnk) be the vector of buyer signals for good k.
Also, let Zjk be the j-th highest signal among the n buyers of good k, with Zk being the vector, and
let Y
j
ik be the j-th highest signal of the bidders other than i,w i t hYik being the vector.
The random variables (Xk,S k)a s s o c i a t e dw i t hg o o dk are independently and identically distributed
across k ∈ {a,b}.T h e j o i n t d e n s i t y f(x,s) is bounded away from zero and inﬁnity, implying that a
buyer is never certain of the seller’s information given his own signal. Furthermore f(x,s)i ss y m m e t r i c
8By limiting the seller’s signal space we can restrict attention to the simplest and most intuitive sequencing strategies.
When S has more than two elements (for example, S is a continuum) the seller could have more complicated strategies
such as selling the better good ﬁrst only if the gap between signals is suﬃciently large.
9For simplicity we assume that there are diﬀerent buyers for each good. This is appropriate when a government
privatizes ﬁrms in diﬀerent industries, or a restructuring ﬁrm sells oﬀ unrelated units. The assumption precludes such
strategies as underbidding for the ﬁrst good so as to lower other buyers’ expectations for the second good (Hausch, 1986).
It also prevents the buyer of the ﬁrst good from acquiring an information advantage when bidding for the second good
(Luton and McAfee, 1986).
6in its ﬁrst n arguments so the distribution of the buyers’ private signals does not depend upon the
identity of the buyers. In a slight tightening of the Milgrom and Weber (1982) assumptions we assume
f(x,s) displays strict rather than weak aﬃliation so that if one player (including the seller) observes a
high private signal of the value of a good, other players are strictly more likely to observe high private
signals of the value of that good.10 To simplify notation, throughout the paper we use f(·)t or e p r e s e n t
joint and marginal densities and f(·|·) to represent conditional densities.
The value of good k to buyer i is given by Vik = V (Xik,{Xi0k}i06=i,S k)f o re a c hXk and Sk where
V : Xn×{H,L} → R is non-decreasing in its ﬁrst n arguments and strictly increasing in its last
argument. Note that the valuations of all buyers for good k depend on the seller’s signal in the same
way, and the valuation of each buyer depends on the signals of the other buyers {Xi0k}i06=i in the same
way.11 Let Vk =( V1k,...,Vnk) be the vector of buyer valuations for good k. A ss h o w ni nM i l g r o m
and Weber (1982), our assumption of aﬃliation and the monotonicity of the function V (·) implies that
the random variables (Vk,X k,S k)a r ea ﬃliated. Note that the random variables (Vk,X k,S k)a r ea l s o
distributed i.i.d. across k.
Seller’s Strategies, the Timing Structure and Equilibrium For a seller with signals Sk = H and
Sk0 = L where k 6= k0, the possible pure strategy sequencing strategies are to sell the good with the high
signal ﬁrst (best foot forward or BFF), to sell the good with the low signal ﬁr s t( b e s tf o rl a s to rB F L ) .
When the signals for the two goods are identical the seller is indiﬀerent about the sequencing strategy,
in which case leading with either good is strategically equivalent and the seller will randomize.12
Buyers in the second auction observe the ﬁrst period price. We also allow for the possibility that
the second period buyers observe other more informative public signals about the good sold in the
ﬁrst period. For example, later buyers in a privatization auction might observe the post-privatization
p e r f o r m a n c eo ft h eﬁrms sold previously.
Our primary interest is the sequential auction with the following timing structure: (1) The seller
observes her signals and decides which good to sell ﬁrst. (2) The buyers of the good the seller sells ﬁrst
note that their good is being sold ﬁrst, observe their private signals, and bid for the good. (3) The
buyers of the good the seller sells second note that their good is being sold second, observe their private
signals, observe the ﬁrst period public signals relating to the ﬁrst period auction, and bid for the good.
In order to facilitate the understanding of our results, we will also consider a “simultaneous” timing
structure that is identical to the sequential case except that buyers of the “second” good do not receive
10Random variables admitting a density are (strictly) aﬃliated if the log of their joint density is a (strict) supermodular
function. A function is supermodular (submodular) if a higher value for any argument does not decrease (increase) the
marginal return to a higher value for the remaining arguments.
11As in Milgrom and Weber (1982) this formulation allows for the possibility of pure common values, where Vik = Vk
for all i. It also allows for a private value component for each buyer, so that buyers may not agree on value even if all
private signals are made public.
12Strategies that condition on the names of the goods, such as selling good a ﬁrst if the signals are the same and good
b ﬁrst otherwise, are not considered.
7any additional information regarding the ﬁrst auction.
We assume that the identical buyers for each good play a symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of
the auction given their correct beliefs about the seller’s strategies and their information, and that the
seller’s strategy is sequentially rational given the buyers’ beliefs.
The Auction, Prices and Bids In each period the seller employs an English auction to sell the
good.13,14 Notice from the timing structure that, even for a ﬁxed auction mechanism and even when
second period buyers do not observe additional signals from the ﬁrst period, the auctions in the two
periods are diﬀerent depending on the buyers’ beliefs about whether the seller is following a mixed,
BFF, or BFL strategy. However, because of the symmetry in the model, for ﬁxed buyer beliefs about
the seller’s strategy, the auction for each good k is identical. In order to exploit this symmetry, we will
consider the auction for each good k rather than the auction for the ﬁrst or second good.
In addition to their private signals Xk, all buyers of good k also observe which period the good
is sold in. If buyers believe the seller is randomly selling the two goods then buyers learns nothing
from this information. But if buyers believe that the seller is following a BFF strategy, then when
good k is sold in the ﬁrst period the buyers of good k interpret this information as the favorable signal
Sk =m a x {Sa,S b},a n dw h e ng o o dk is sold in the second period the buyers of the good interpret this
information as the unfavorable signal Sk =m i n {Sa,S b}. If buyers believe that the seller is following
a BFL strategy the signals are reversed. Since we focus attention on only these two pure strategies,
we can exploit the symmetry in the model by deﬁning one signal that captures how buyers combine
their information about the period the good is sold in with their beliefs about the seller’s strategy. In
particular we deﬁne the ordinal signal Tk ∈ {τL,τ H},τ H >τ L where:
Tk = τH ⇒ Sk =m a x {Sa,S b}
Tk = τL ⇒ Sk =m i n {Sa,S b}.
This signal partially reveals the seller’s private information Sk and captures the pure rank eﬀect of
the seller’s strategy. In our benchmark case where the goods are sold simultaneously, Tk is the only
public signal that buyers of any good receive. But when the goods are sold sequentially, with good
k sold in the second period, buyers of good k may also observe additional signals Ψk0 aﬃliated with
the seller’s signal Sk0 for good k0 that is sold in the ﬁrst period. Let Φk denote the diﬀerent public
signals that buyers of good k may receive in diﬀerent scenarios. Thus, Φk = Tk i ft h eg o o d sa r es o l d
simultaneously or if good k is sold ﬁrst, while Φk = {Tk,Ψk0} if the goods are sold sequentially and
good k is sold second.
13In particular, we consider an ascending bid auction where the price rises continuously and each bidder has to decide
when to drop out from the auction after observing the number of active bidders and when other bidders have dropped
out. Drop—outs are ﬁnal. See Milgrom and Weber (1982).
14We do not consider reserve prices and entry fees. More generally, we do not consider mechanism design issues but
instead take the selling mechanism as given.
8As noted above, the signal Ψk0 could simply be the ﬁrst period price Pk0.E v e nt h o u g ha l ls i g n a l s
associated with the two goods are independently drawn, the price Pk0 is correlated with the seller’s
signal for good k0 and so, via the seller’s sequencing strategy, it is correlated with the seller’s signal for
good k. As a result, the price Pk0 is relevant information for buyers of good k, as long as the buyers
believe that the seller is conditioning her sequencing strategy on her private information. Furthermore,
due to independence, the seller’s sequencing strategy is the only channel through which the auctions
for the two goods are related.
For any buyer i, realizations Xik = x, Y
j
ik = yj for j =1 ,...,n − 1o ft h ep r i v a t es i g n a l s , and a
realization Φk = φ of the public signal, deﬁne the function vk(·)a s
vk(x,y1,...,yn−1,φ)=E[Vik|Xik = x,Y 1
ik = y1,...,Y
n−1
ik = yn−1,Φk = φ]. (1)
Due to symmetry vk(·) does not depend on the identity of the bidder. We focus on the symmetric
equilibrium characterized by Milgrom and Weber (1982). In this equilibrium the bidder with the
highest signal will win the auction and pay a price equal to the bid of the second highest bidder. The
second highest bidder’s bid will equal the expected value of the good given that he is tied for the
highest bid after observing n−2 bidders with the lowest signals drop out (thereby inferring their signals
Z3k,...,Znk), and also given the public signals Φk0. The price of good k as a function of the private and
public signals is therefore
Pk(Xk,Φk)=vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,Φk). (2)
4 Revenue eﬀects
We ﬁrst investigate the revenue advantages of sequencing strategies rather than randomly selling the
goods. Throughout this section we assume the seller can commit to a sequencing strategy and postpone
analysis of equilibrium strategies until the next section. We start out by considering the case where
buyers do not observe the ﬁrst period price or any other information about the ﬁrst auction. Without
such information, the only public signal that the buyers of good k receive is Tk ∈ {τH,τ L}. Therefore
this case is essentially a simultaneous auction where the “period” could be, for instance, the room that
the good is auctioned in rather than the time that it is auctioned. Since the two pure strategies BFF and
BFL are identical subject to renaming the periods, we will refer to either strategy as a “rank-revealing
strategy”. We will refer to the strategy of completely randomizing the sale of the goods as the mixed
strategy.
Following Milgrom and Weber (1982), ex ante the seller always beneﬁts in expectation from revealing
information. For each good k, the “period” in which the good is sold is informative for the buyers as
it tells them whether the seller’s signal Sk for the good is the maximum or the minimum of two
independent draws. Therefore, in accordance with the linkage principle, the seller would like to commit
9to a rank-revealing strategy. We state this as our ﬁrst result. It follows immediately from Theorem 12,
Milgrom and Weber (1982).
Result 1 In the simultaneous auction a rank-revealing strategy generates higher ex ante expected rev-
enues than the mixed strategy.
In the sequential auction, buyers may observe the ﬁrst period price or other information from the
ﬁrst period auction. Information from the ﬁrst period provides additional information regarding the
realization of the seller’s signal in the second period. If buyers believe the seller follows either pure
strategy, a high ﬁrst period price raises the probability that the seller received two high signals, and
therefore raises the estimated value of the second period good for each buyer. By the linkage principle
the expected revenues from the best foot forward or best for last strategy are therefore higher when
buyers observe ﬁrst period information compared to the simultaneous auction. On the other hand, for
the mixed strategy where the seller does not condition the sequencing on her information, the expected
r e v e n u e sw i l lb et h es a m ef o rt h es i m u l t a n e o u sa n dsequential auctions because information about
good k0 contains no information for the buyers of good k, due to independence of all signals across k.
Therefore, compared to the simultaneous case, in the sequential auction the seller has an even greater
incentive to commit to a rank-revealing strategy. We collect these observationsa so u rn e x tr e s u l tw h i c h
also follows immediately from Theorem 12 in Milgrom and Weber (1982)
Result 2 (i) Both pure strategies in the sequential auction generate higher expected revenues than a
rank-revealing strategy in the simultaneous auction. (ii) The mixed strategy generates the same expected
revenues in the sequential and simultaneous auctions.
A natural question is whether the expected revenues from best foot forward and best for last can be
unambiguously ranked. Under the best foot forward strategy the ﬁrst period price signal is more likely
to carry positive information about the second period good. However, under the best for last strategy
t h em o r ev a l u a b l eg o o di ss o l di nt h es e c o n dp e r i o dwhen this information has been released, thereby
reducing buyer information rents for the more valuable good. Consequently, the revenues cannot be
ranked in general. In Section 7 we provide an example of an auction where best for last generates higher
revenues for all parameter values, thereby supporting the idea that buyers should be “warmed up” with
cheaper goods ﬁrst.15
These revenue results are based on the assumption that the seller can commit to a strategy that
reveals information. Milgrom and Weber (1982) suggest that an auction house could commit to reveal
information by virtue of its reputation, and the same possibility exists in this model. However, as the
following section shows, in many cases sequencing the goods is an equilibrium so reputation and other
commitment devices are not necessary.
15Relatedly, McMillan (1994) notes that the issue of whether to sell rights for large or small regions ﬁrst was considered
in designing spectrum auctions in the U.S., with one factor being that the linkage principle favored a small to large
sequence. However, this situation diﬀers from ours in that the size diﬀerences between regions are common knowledge.
105 Equilibrium strategies
We now consider when a sequencing strategy is an equilibrium. In both the simultaneous and sequential
auctions the question is whether, given buyer beliefs about whether the better or worse good is being
sold, the seller has an incentive to follow the expectations or instead trick the buyers and reverse the
order. Again, it is convenient to start with a simultaneous auction. For a seller with one high signal
and one low signal,16 the payoﬀ from following the rank-revealing strategy is E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = H]+
E[Pk0(Xk0,τ L)|Sk0 = L]a n dt h ep a y o ﬀ from deviating is E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = H]+E[Pk0(Xk0,τ H)|Sk0 =
L]. Because of the symmetry in the model, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for an equilibrium
can be written as
E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = H]+E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = L] ≥
E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = H]+E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = L].
(3)
Reversing the order of the goods increases the expected price for one good and decreases it for
the other. Our next proposition provides suﬃcient conditions on the primitives of the model under
which the net gain is positive or negative. We ﬁnd that both the shape of V and the prior probability
λ of a favorable seller signal interact to determine whether the net beneﬁt from deviation is positive
or negative. When V is supermodular and λ is low, both factors favor sticking with the equilibrium
strategy, and when V is submodular and λ is high, both factors favor deviation.
Proposition 1 If V (x1,...,x n,s) is supermodular (submodular) in (xi,s) then there exists λ,λ ∈ (0,1)
such that if λ ≤ λ (λ>λ ) a rank-revealing strategy is (not) an equilibrium of the simultaneous auction.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To understand the role of λ, note that the sensitivity of buyers’ bids to their own information is
decreasing in the strength of their priors about the seller’s signal. Therefore, since buyer information is
correlated with the seller’s signal, the seller has an incentive to sell the better good when buyer priors
are weakest, and to sell the worse good when buyer priors are strongest. When λ is high the buyers
have strong priors that the higher ranked good is of high quality but are less certain about the lower
ranked good. Therefore this “priors eﬀect” gives the seller an incentive to trick buyers and sell the
better good when buyers expect the worse good. When λ is low the priors eﬀect works in the opposite
direction. Buyers have strong priors that the lower ranked good is bad, but are less certain about the
higher ranked good. Thus, the seller has an incentive to stick with the equilibrium strategy and sell the
better good when buyers are expecting it.
Regarding the shape of V ,i fV is supermodular then the seller’s signal and the buyers’ signals are
complements in determining buyer valuations. In this case buyers bid more aggressively in response to
their own favorable information when they are optimistic about the seller’s signal, so the seller should
16When the seller receives identical signals, there is no strategic decision to be made as the seller is indiﬀerent between
sequencing choices, and we assume that, in equilibrium, the seller sells either good ﬁrst with probability 1
2.
11sell her better good when buyers are expecting her to. A suﬃcient condition for strict supermodularity
is multiplicative separability of buyer values in the seller’s information and the buyers’ own information.
Such separability can occur when the seller has information on a common component and the individual
buyers have information on a private component. For instance, multiplicative separability could arise in
divestiture auctions of two units if buyers for each unit have a private signal about how well they could
manage the unit, the divesting ﬁrm knows the general productivity of each unit, and proﬁtability of a
unit is a multiplicative function of both factors. Similarly, multiplicative separability could occur in a
privatization auction of two ﬁrms in separate industries if the buyers for each ﬁrm have a private signal
about the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability and the government knows the likely tax rates in the two industries.
If V is submodular then the seller’s signal and the buyers’ signals are substitutes in determining
buyer valuations. In this case the seller’s incentive to deviate is stronger because buyers bid less
aggressively in response to their own favorable information when they are optimistic about the seller’s
signal. Submodularity is less common in the literature but can easily be justiﬁed in some cases. For
instance, if the value of the good is a concave function of the sum of the diﬀerent signals of the buyers
and the seller, then submodularity holds.
A special case is where V is weakly both supermodular and submodular so there is only the priors
eﬀect and an equilibrium exists for λ low enough and does not exist for λ high enough. For instance, this
is clearly the case in a common value auction with a perfectly informed seller since V (x1,...,xn,s)=s.
The same result arises in a more general aﬃliated values auction if V is additively separable in the
seller’s information and the buyers’ own information. For instance, in the above divestiture example it
m i g h tb et h a tp r o ﬁtability of a unit is an additive rather than multiplicative function of the two factors.
With the simultaneous auction as a baseline, we now consider equilibrium strategies in the sequential
auction where buyers of the second period good can see information about the ﬁrst period good. As
shown in the example of Figure 1, endogenous correlation makes such information of interest to buyers
of the second period good. As a result the seller expects that the second period price will be aﬀected
by the quality of the good sold in the ﬁrst period. We call this expected impact the “impression eﬀect”.
Lemma 1 For both the best foot forward and best for last strategies, when good k is sold in the second
period, observation of the ﬁrst period signal Ψk0 by second period buyers raises (lowers) the expected
second period price if the seller sells a good with a high (low) signal Sk0 in the ﬁrst period: for all
τ ∈ {τH,τ L} and each s ∈ {H,L} of Sk,
E[Pk(Xk,τ,Ψk0)|Sk0 = H,Sk = s] >E [Pk(Xk,τ)|Sk = s] >E [Pk(Xk,τ,Ψk0)|Sk0 = L,Sk = s]. (4)
Proof. In the Appendix.
The proof depends on the aﬃliation between the ﬁrst period public signal and the ﬁrst period buyer
signals, the aﬃliation between these buyer signals and the ﬁrst period seller signal, the endogenous
correlation between the ﬁrst and second period seller signals, and the aﬃliation between the second
12period buyer signals and the second period seller signal. A special case of interest is when second
period buyers observe only the ﬁrst period price, Ψk0 = Pk0.
Corollary 1 If buyers of good k only observe the ﬁrst period price Pk0 then for all τ ∈ {τH,τ L},a n d
each value s ∈ {H,L} of Sk,
E[Pk(Xk,τ,P k0)|Sk0 = H,Sk = s] >E [Pk(Xk,τ)|Sk = s] >E [Pk(Xk,τ,P k0)|Sk0 = L,Sk = s]. (5)
If, as in the simultaneous auction, the ﬁrst period price is not observed, then the best foot forward
and best for last strategies are equivalent so either both are equilibria or neither are equilibria. The
impression eﬀect adds a boost in favor of the best foot forward strategy and against the best for last
strategy, implying that the equilibrium condition for the former is always less strict than that for the
latter. Thus whenever best for last is an equilibrium best foot forward must also be an equilibrium,
but not the converse. One equilibrium which always exists is where the seller plays a mixed strategy of
randomly sequencing the sale of the goods. If buyers expect such randomization the seller is indiﬀerent
between sequencing strategies because the ﬁrst period price conveys no information to the buyers.
Proposition 2 (i) If best for last is an equilibrium, then best foot forward is an equilibrium. (ii) If
a rank-revealing strategy is an equilibrium in the simultaneous auction, then best foot forward is an
equilibrium in the sequential auction. (iii) If a rank-revealing strategy is not an equilibrium in the
simultaneous auction, then best for last is not an equilibrium in the sequential auction. (iv) The mixed
strategy is always an equilibrium.
Proof. Exploiting the symmetry between good k and good k0, the equilibrium condition for BFF can
be written as,
E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = H]+E[Pk(Xk,τ L,Ψk0)|Sk0 = H,Sk = L]
≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = L]+E[Pk(Xk,τ L,Ψk0)|Sk0 = L,Sk = H]( 6 )
and that for BFL can be written as
E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = L]+E[Pk(Xk,τ H,Ψk0)|Sk0 = L,Sk = H]
≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = H]+E[Pk(Xk,τ H,Ψk0)|Sk0 = H,Sk = L]. (7)
The proof of (i)-(iii) follows from (4) by observing that the left-hand side of (6) is greater than the
left-hand side of (3) while the right-hand side of (6) is less than the right-hand side of (3), and similarly
that the left-hand side of (7) is less than the left-hand side of (3) while the right-hand side of (7) is
greater than the right-hand side of (3). The proof of (iv) follows from the fact that if the buyers believe
that the seller does not condition the sequencing decision on her information then, for each realization
of her signals, all sequencing strategies for the seller yield the same expected revenues.
13Note that it is possible for both pure strategy equilibria to exist so that the actual outcome will
depend on receiver beliefs in the particular context. It is also possible for neither pure strategy equi-
librium to exist so the seller will randomize the order. The more powerful is the impression eﬀect in
(4), the stronger is the incentive in (6) to follow the best foot forward strategy and the weaker is the
incentive in (7) to follow the best for last strategy. The extreme case is where the seller is fully informed
of the goods’ values and the seller’s ﬁrst period signal is fully revealed. This situation was examined in
the introductory example for a parameterized case where buyers did not have informative signals and
it was shown that best foot forward was the unique pure strategy equilibrium. In fact, this result also
holds when buyers have informative signals.
Proposition 3 In a common value auction where the seller is perfectly informed, Vk = Sk,a n dt h e
seller’s signal is revealed between periods, Ψk0 = Sk0, best foot forward is an equilibrium and is the
unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Under the BFF strategy if the ﬁrst period seller signal is L then buyers will infer the second
period seller signal is also L. Therefore, for Ψk0 = L, the second period price is E[Pk(Xk,τ L,L)|Sk0 =
L,Sk = H]=L. So the equilibrium condition for BFF simpliﬁes to
E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = H]+E[Pk(Xk,τ L,H)|Sk0 = H,Sk = L] ≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = L]+L (8)
which holds since aﬃliation implies E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = H] ≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = L]a n ds i n c eVk =
Sk ∈ {L,H} implies E[Pk(Xk,τ L,H)|Sk0 = H,Sk = L] ≥ L. Conversely, under the BFL strategy
E[Pk(Xk,τ H,H)|Sk0 = H,Sk = L]=H. So the condition for BFL simpliﬁes to
E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = L]+E[Pk(Xk,τ H,L)|Sk0 = L,Sk = H] ≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = H]+H (9)
which does not hold since aﬃliation implies E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = L] ≤ E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = H] and since
Vk = Sk ∈ {L,H} implies E[Pk(Xk,τ H,L)|Sk0 = L,Sk = H] <H .
As discussed in Section 4, in some cases the expected revenues from a best for last strategy might
be higher than from a best foot forward strategy. Therefore a conﬂict can arise between equilibrium
and revenue-maximizing strategies if the best for last strategy yields higher revenues but is not an
equilibrium.17 In Section 7 we provide an example where best for last yields higher revenues than best
foot forward for all parameter values, but only best foot forward is an equilibrium for a subset of these
values.
To conclude this section we turn to a discussion of expected prices across periods under the diﬀerent
pure strategies. As discussed in the introduction, empirical evidence indicates that the prices of seem-
ingly identical goods often fall during the cour s eo fas e q u e n t i a la u c t i o n .W h i l ean u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent
approaches have been taken to explain this anomaly, they are focused primarily on buyer characteristics
17When neither best foot forward nor best for last is an equilibrium there is also a conﬂict since either strategy generates
higher revenues than the mixed strategy.
14and strategies. We ﬁnd that the “afternoon eﬀect” can also arise endogenously out of the seller’s choice
of an equilibrium sequencing strategy when the goods are stochastically equivalent rather than identical
as often assumed in the literature. Even though all signals related to the two goods are identically and
independently distributed, either sequencing strategy results in prices being correlated over time. As
the next result shows, when the seller employs the best foot forward strategy, prices fall simply because
on average the second good is of lower value than the ﬁrst good based on the seller’s private information.
This negative eﬀect outweighs the positive eﬀect on second period prices from the linkage principle.
Proposition 4 (i) Under the best foot forward strategy the expected ﬁrst period price is higher than the
expected second period price:
E[Pk(Xk,τ H)] >E [Pk(Xk,τ L,Ψk0)]. (10)
(ii) Under the best for last strategy the expected ﬁrst period price is lower than the expected second period
price:
E[Pk(Xk,τ L)] <E [Pk(Xk,τ H,Ψk0)]. (11)
(iii) Under the mixed strategy the expected ﬁrst period price is equal to the expected second period price:
E[Pk(Xk)] = E[Pk(Xk,Ψk0)]. (12)
Proof. In the Appendix.
6 Extension: Exogenous Correlation
The previous section shows how the sender’s sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation in
t h ev a l u e so ft h eﬁrst and second period goods, thereby creating an impression eﬀe c tt h a tf a v o r st h e
best foot forward strategy. If the values of the two goods are exogenously correlated, separate from the
sequencing strategy, clearly the impression eﬀect will be stronger. For instance, if the two goods are
very likely to be of the same quality then buyers will be strongly aﬀected by any information about
the ﬁrst good. Therefore if the realized values of the goods are of diﬀerent quality, the seller would be
particularly ill-advised to sell the worse good ﬁrst.18
To examine the impact of exogenous correlation we extend the model to allow the seller’s signals to
be correlated with each other but otherwise maintain all of the model’s other assumptions. Separate
from the impact on the impression eﬀect, we ﬁnd that the priors eﬀect identiﬁed in Proposition 1
is weakened by exogenous correlation and disappears asymptotically as correlation increases. As the
18For instance in the introductory example of Section 2, in the limit as the goods are perfectly correlated, following
the best foot forward strategy when buyers expect it gives a second period price of 1 and deviating gives a second period
price of 0.
15correlation increases buyers become increasingly certain that either the seller has a favorable signal for
both goods or an unfavorable signal for both goods, so buyer priors are increasingly similar for the higher
and lower ranked good. The asymptotic disappearance of the priors eﬀect implies that condition (3)
holds with equality, meaning that in the simultaneous auction the seller is indiﬀerent between ordering
the goods truthfully or not. Since the impression eﬀect remains strictly positive, best foot forward is
the unique equilibrium in the sequential auction.
Proposition 5 For given λ, if the seller’s signals Sa and Sb are suﬃciently positively correlated then
best foot forward is the unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Regarding the declining price anomaly, for the case of independent Sa and Sb it was shown that the
downward eﬀect on the price path from the ﬁrst period good being better under the best foot forward
strategy was larger than the upward eﬀect on the price path from the linkage principle. For the case of
perfect exogenous correlation it is known that the linkage principle implies rising prices (Milgrom and
Weber, 2000), so continuity arguments therefore imply that the eﬀect of the linkage principle dominates
for suﬃciently high exogenous correlation.
7A n E x a m p l e
We now expand on the introductory example of Section 2 by allowing buyers to have private information
that generates information rents. We con s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r et h ei m p r e s s i o ne ﬀect is the weakest in
that second period buyers only observe the ﬁrst period price rather than a more informative signal of
the ﬁrst period good’s value.19
Similar to the earlier example, Vk ∈ {0,1} where Pr[Vk =1 ]=γ for k ∈ {a,b}. The seller has a
signal of each good’s value Sk ∈ {L,H} where




for k ∈ {a,b}. Therefore the probability λ of a good seller signal is Pr[Sk = H]=αγ +( 1− α)(1 − γ).
For each good there are n = 2 buyers who each receive a noisy signal of the quality of the good being
sold in that period, Xk ∈ {L,H},w h e r e




for k ∈ {a,b}. For simplicity we assume that the buyer and seller signals are independent conditional
on the value of the good. We continue to use an English auction, which with two bidders is equivalent
to a second-price auction.
19In privatization and divestiture auctions, assets are typically sold over a period of many years so buyers interested in
assets sold later are likely to see highly informative signals regarding the values of assets sold earlier.
16Figure 2: Net revenue gain from following equilibrium strategy, α =1 ,β = 3
4.
Regarding revenue-maximizing strategies, if the seller can commit to a strategy then Results 1 and
2 imply that revenues from either BFF or BFL are higher than those from the mixed strategy because
the ranking and the ﬁrst period price publicly reveal information. For instance, for α =1 ,β = 3
4,a n d
γ = 1
2 the revenue gain from BFF relative to the mixed strategy is about 4.6%, while the gain from
BFL is about 6.1%.20 In fact, in this example, BFL oﬀers slightly higher revenues than BFF for all
parameter values.
Regarding what strategies can be an equilibrium without commitment, consider the case where
α = 1 so the auction is a pure common value auction and the value function is both weakly submodular
and weakly supermodular as discussed earlier. Therefore, from Proposition 1, the priors eﬀect implies
a rank-revealing equilibrium exists for λ small enough and does not exist for λ large enough. Noting
that when α =1 ,P r [ Sk = H]=P r [ Vk =1 ]s oλ = γ, this can be seen in Figure 2. The RR line
shows that the net revenue gain from sticking to a rank-revealing strategy rather than deviating is
positive for γ<1
2 and negative for γ>1
2. The impression eﬀect implies that the seller always has more
incentive to stick with the BFF strategy and less incentive to stick with the BFL strategy. Consistent
with Proposition 2, Figure 2 shows that BFF is an equilibrium for a larger range of γ than BFL is.21,22
20Note that for low values of β neither buyer has much information while for high values of β both buyers have highly
correlated information. The gains from reducing buyer information rents are highest for intermediate values of β where
these rents are largest.
21The incentive to follow BFF and deviate from BFL was stronger in the introductory example because the actual seller
signal from the ﬁrst period, rather than just the price, was revealed in the second period. In fact, from Proposition 3,
BFF is then the unique pure strategy equilibrium for any γ and any β.
22Note that the graph is not symmetric. The English auction format makes a high price in the ﬁrst period price a
particularly strong signal of second period quality when buyers expect the seller to follow BFL. The incentive to deviate
17Figure 3: Declining price pattern under BFF strategy, γ = 1
2.
Therefore, even though a policy of committing to BFL raises more revenue than BFF for all parameter
values, for some values of γ only BFF can be implemented as an equilibrium outcome in the absence of
commitment.
From Proposition 4 we know that the expected second period price is lower than the expected
ﬁrst period price when the seller follows the best foot forward strategy. Figure 3 shows this afternoon
eﬀect for γ = 1
2 when α and β jointly vary from 1
2 to 1. For α = β = 1
2 the seller’s signal is
completely uninformative so the buyers bid the unconditional expected value of 1
2 in each period. As
the informativeness of the seller’s signal increases, the expected values of the goods diverge, with the
expected value of the ﬁrst good (labelled as E[V1]) increasing linearly to 3
4 and the expected value of
the second good (labelled as E[V2]) decreasing linearly to 1
4. The expected prices for the two periods
(labelled as E[P1]a n dE[P2]) do not follow this pattern exactly due to the buyers’ information rents.
Although the information rents are smaller for the second good due to the linkage principle, as seen by
the smaller gap between E[V2]a n dE[P2] than between E[V1]a n dE[P1], the expected prices decline
between periods for all parameter values. In contrast, if the two goods were identical rather than
just stochastically equivalent, the linkage principle would imply the opposite pattern of rising prices
(Milgrom and Weber, 2000).
from BFL is therefore stronger than the incentive to follow BFF.
188C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that sequencing is an important strategic decision in the auction of multiple goods even
when the goods are ex ante independent. Leading with either the better or worse good endogenously
generates correlation across periods so evidence of a high quality good in the ﬁrst period, such as a
high price, makes a positive impression on second period buyers. When the impression eﬀect is strong
enough, leading with the better good is the unique pure strategy equilibrium. Either strategy reveals
the seller’s private information about the relative value of the goods. Since this ordinal information
is credible when the sequencing strategy is an equilibrium, revenues increase in accordance with the
linkage principle.
The issue of how to credibly reveal ordinal information is more general than sequential auctions
(Chakraborty, Gupta, and Harbaugh, 2002; Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2003). While seller statements
about the values of their goods are normally suspect, ordinal signals can be part of an equilibrium
strategy since they simultaneously reveal both good and bad information. For instance, if a seller
provides estimated valuations for a set of goods the ordinal information might be credible even if the
cardinal information is not. Compared to simultaneous auctions, sequential auctions are better at
revealing ordinal information even when the only signal between periods is the price. The impression
eﬀect from observation of the ﬁrst period price expands the range in which a pure strategy equilibrium
exists, and thereby expands the range in which the sequencing strategy can credibly reveal information.
9A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 Condition (3) is equivalent to showing that E[Pk(Xk,τ H)−Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk]
is non-decreasing in Sk, which from (2) is equivalent to showing that E[vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ H) −
vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ L)|Sk] is non-decreasing in Sk.W e l o o k f o r s u ﬃcient conditions for this to hold
and suﬃcient conditions for it not to hold.
From (1),
vk(Xik,Y ik,T k)=E[V (Xik,{Y
j






ik},s)Pr[Sk = s|Xik,Y ik,T k].
Then





ik},s){Pr[S = s|Xik,Y ik,τ H] − Pr[S = s|Xik,Y ik,τ L]}
=[ V (Xik,{Y
j
ik},H) − V (Xik,{Y
j
ik},L)]{Pr[H|Xik,Y ik,τ H] − Pr[H|Xik,Y ik,τ L]}.
(15)










Sk∈{H,L} f(τH|s,s0)f(Xik,Y ik|Sk)f(Sk0,S k)
=
λ1f(Xik,Y ik|H)
λ1f(Xik,Y ik|H)+( 1− λ1)f(Xik,Y ik|L)
(16)
where
λ1 ≡ Pr[Sk = H|Tk = τH]=1− (1 − λ)2




λ2f(Xik,Y ik|H)+( 1− λ2)f(Xik,Y ik|L)
(17)
where
λ2 ≡ Pr[Sk = H|Tk = τL]=λ2.





and deﬁne the function
h(l) ≡
2λ(1 − λ)l
[λ1l +( 1− λ1)][λ2l +( 1− λ2)]
. (19)
Noting that
h(l(Xik,Y ik)) = Pr[H|Xik,Y ik,τ H] − Pr[H|Xik,Y ik,τ L],
it follows from (15)—(19) that if
E[{V (Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,H) − V (Z2k,Z 2k,...,Z nk,L)}h(l(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk))|Sk] (20)
is non-decreasing in Sk then a rank revealing strategy is an equilibrium, and if it is decreasing it
is not an equilibrium. Supermodularity (submodularity) of V implies the ﬁrst expression in braces
inside the expectation is non-decreasing (non-increasing) in each of its ﬁrst n arguments. Further, by
aﬃliation, the likelihood ratio l(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk) is non-decreasing in each argument. Therefore, to
show existence (non-existence) for supermodular (submodular) V ,i ts u ﬃces to show that h(l)i sn o n -




(1 − λ)2(1 − λ2)
(1 − (1 − λ)2)λ2. (21)
20Let λ be such that v u u t(1 − λ)2(1 − λ
2
)
(1 − (1 − λ)2)λ
2 =s u p
x,y1,...,yn−1∈Xn
l(x,y1,...,yn−1).
Since the left-hand side of the expression above is continuous and monotonically decreasing in λ, equal
t o0a tλ =1 , and approaching inﬁnity as λ goes to 0, and since the right-hand side is bounded away
from inﬁnity by the full support assumption, such a λ ∈ (0,1) exists by the intermediate value theorem.
Regarding non-existence, note that h0(l) < 0 if and only if the inequality in (21) is reversed and
strict. Let λ be such that
s
(1 − λ)2(1 − λ
2)
(1 − (1 − λ)2)λ
2 =i n f
x,y1,...,yn−1∈Xn l(x,y1,...,yn−1).
Since the right-hand side is greater than zero by the full support assumption, by the same argument as
above such a λ ∈ (0,1) exists.
Proof of Lemma 1: Impression Eﬀect Recall that, when the only signal that buyers of good
k observe is Tk, the expected price of good k conditional on the seller’s signal Sk = s ∈ {H,L}, given
a realized value τ ∈ {τH,τ L} of Tk is
















By independence of the random variables related to good k from good k0 the density of Ψk0 conditional











By strict aﬃliation of Sk0 with Ψk0 and the monotonicity of vk in Ψk0 we have
E[vk(x,y1,...,yn−1,(τ,Ψk0))|Sk0 = H]
>v k(x,y1,...,yn−1,τ)
>E [vk(x,y1,...,yn−1,(τ,Ψk0))|Sk0 = L].
Therefore,
E[Pk(Xk,τ)|Sk = s]
= E[vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ)|Sk = s]
>E [E[vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,(τ,Ψk0))|Sk0 = L]|Sk = s]
= E[vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,(τ,Ψk0))|Sk0 = L,Sk = s]
= E[Pk(Xk,(τ,Ψk0))|Sk0 = L,Sk = s].
21Similarly,
E[Pk(Xk,τ)|Sk = s]
= E[vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ)|Sk = s]
<E [E[vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,(τ,Ψk0))|Sk0 = H]|Sk = s]
= E[vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,(τ,Ψk0))|Sk0 = H,Sk = s]
= E[Pk(Xk,(τ,Ψk0))|Sk0 = H,Sk = s].
This concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :A f t e r n o o nE ﬀect We start with the proof of (i). Note ﬁrst that the
expected second period price under the BFF strategy is higher when second period buyers actually
directly observe the seller’s ﬁrst period signal than when they only observe the ﬁrst period price:
E[Pk(Xk,(τL,Ψk0))] ≤ E[Pk(Xk,(τL,S k0))] (22)
as the signal {τL,S k0} contains more information about Sk than the signal {τL,Ψk0} (see Theorem 13
in Milgrom and Weber (1982a)).
Furthermore, for ﬁxed x,y1,...,yn−1 and τ = τL,
vk(x,y1,...,yn−1,(τL,s 0)) = E[Vik|Xik = x,Y 1
ik = y1,...,Y
n−1
ik = yn−1,T k = τL,S k0 = s0]
<E [Vik|Xik = x,Y 1
ik = y1,...,Y
n−1
ik = yn−1,S k0 = s0]





where the inequality follows from strict aﬃliation of Tk with the other random variables related to good
k, the next equality follows from the fact that Sk0 is independent of Sk (and contains information about
Sk only in conjunction with τk) and the last equality is deﬁnitional where we use the notation Φk = ∅
to denote the case where the buyers of good k receive no public signal. Thus,
E[Pk(Xk,(τL,S k0))] = E[vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ L,S k0)] <E [vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,∅)] = E[Pk(Xk,∅)].
(23)
Finally, note that
E[Pk(Xk,∅)] = E[vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,∅)] <E [vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ H)] = E[Pk(Xk,τ H)] (24)
as
vk(z2,z 2,...,zn,∅)=E[Vik|Xik = z2,Y1
ik = z2,...,Y n
ik = zn]
<E [Vik|Xik = z2,Y1
ik = z2,...,Y n
ik = zn,T k = τH]
= vk(z2,z 2,...,zn,τ H)
22where the inequality follows from strict aﬃliation. From (22)–(24) we conclude that (i) holds.
The proof of (ii) is similar and that of (iii) follows immediately from symmetry and the inability of
the mixed strategy to reveal information. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5: Exogenous Correlation Because Sk and Sk0 are identically distrib-
uted, their joint distribution can be represent e dw i t ht w op a r a m e t e r s .I np a r t i c u l a rl e tP r [ Sk = H,Sk0 =
H]=λ − c,P r [ Sk = L,Sk0 = L]=1− λ − c,a n dP r [ Sk = H,Sk0 = L]=c.A sb e f o r eP r [ Sk = H]=λ.
If Sk and Sk0 are independent then c = λ(1 − λ). For ﬁxed λ, as correlation increases, c decreases
monotonically with c = 0 for correlation equal to one. We continue to assume that conditional on Sk
and Sk0 the distribution of Xk depends only on Sk and that the value of the good for buyers of good k
does not depend on signals associated with good k0.
First note that all expected values such as the function vk(.) are continuous in the correlation
parameter c so that expected prices given the seller’s signal are also continuous in the correlation
parameter c. Furthermore all these expressions are well—deﬁned in the extreme case of perfect correlation
where c = 0. Next, replicating the arguments in the proof of Proposition 1 in the case of correlation, we
obtain expressions (15) to (17) with the diﬀerence that now λ1 = λ+c whereas λ2 = λ−c.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
in the case c =0 ,w eo b t a i n
Pr[H|Xik,Y ik,τ H]=P r [ H|Xik,Y ik,τ L] (25)
so that the seller’s incentive to follow (or deviate) from the rank revealing strategy exactly disappears
at c = 0. Furthermore, note that the proof of the impression eﬀect in Lemma 1 did not rely on
independence of Sk and Sk0, but only on the independence of Xk from Sk0 given Sk, implying that the
impression eﬀect remains strictly positive for all c ∈ [0,λ(1 − λ)]. Since the impression eﬀect is strict,
by the same arguments as in Proposition 2, we conclude that BFF is a strict equilibrium (and BFL is
not an equilibrium) at c = 0. By continuity of relevant expected values in c, the result then follows for
c small enough. ¥
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